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Sovereignty and Federalism: The Canadian Perspective
Katharine F. Braid*
Robert V. Horte**
INTRODUCTION
I was invited to speak to this institute when I was a real lawyer. I am
no longer working in that capacity, but Henry was too nice to revoke
the invitation when my job responsibilities changed. So although I
know even less law than I did a year ago, you still have to be polite
because I am a client now. My current responsibility of strategy devel-
opment for CP Rail System leads me to look at Canadian sovereignty
and free trade from the perspective of a Canadian railway company
operating across provincial, state and international boundaries in Ca-
nada and the United States.
Free trade under the Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
is definitely affecting the movement of goods and services within and
between Canada and the United States. The Canadian railway industry
has seen a shift in the direction of certain types of commodity traffic as
a result of the FTA. We expect this trend to continue.
Approximately one-third (6,600 mi.) of the total trackage oper-
ated by CP Rail System is now located in the United States. Between
1988 and 1993, total domestic Canadian tonnage shipped by CP Rail
System decreased at a rate of 2.2% per year (or slightly more than
10 % over these five years). By contrast, transborder tonnage increased
at an annual rate of 7.2% (or slightly more than 40% over these five
years).
Free trade pressures are pushing Canada, the U.S., and now Mex-
ico, to harmonize legislation in many areas, including some not obvi-
ously related to trade. Theoretically, the exigencies of free trade may
not support or even reflect the policy agendas of the participating sov-
ereign states. Many argue that free trade threatens their normal policy-
making powers. The degree to which Canadian sovereignty survives
under free trade will influence the way Canadian railways and other
industries do business in North America.
At the outset, I want to be clear that my view as an executive of a
North American railway company is that free trade is, on balance, a
good thing. I also believe that some degree of harmonization of legisla-
tion and regulation in areas that directly affect business and trade is a
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1
Braid and Horte: Sovereignty and Federalism: The Canadian Perspective
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1994
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
good thing, because the cost to North American businesses of comply-
ing with the diverse, complex and sometimes dissonant legislative and
regulatory requirements of the provinces and states in which they oper-
ate is substantial.
As an American who has lived in Canada for many years, I also
feel that the cultural differences between Canada and the U.S. are mi-
nor from a global perspective. While certainly not identical, Canadian
and American cultures and values are already similar, or at least com-
patible enough that any further conformity imposed by free trade
should not result in dramatic change for either country.
Recognizing that these are my biases, I propose to describe how I
see North American free trade generally affecting Canadian sover-
eignty, and to look specifically at its effect in two areas of Canadian
social policy that concern the railway industry - the environment and
labor. Before I begin, let me delineate my conclusions:
FIRST, sovereignty in Canadian federalism has more than one appli-
cation: there is Canada's sovereignty as a nation, and there is also
the sovereignty of each of its ten provinces and two territories.
SECOND, although free trade is exerting pressures on the use of sov-
ereign powers by both Canada and the provinces, these pressures can
be attenuated in some areas of policy-making. A look at environmen-
tal and labor policy, in particular, illustrates this point.
THIRD, I believe the claim that free trade is a fundamental threat to
Canadian sovereignty is overstated. I recognize that free trade will
strongly influence the exercise of sovereign powers, but I do not see
an irreconcilable conflict between the two. Canada's entry into the
FTA and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is,
in itself, an expression of sovereignty. The fact that future curtail-
ment of sovereign powers could occur may be viewed as an incidental
- and authorized - consequence of that primary expression of
sovereignty.
FOURTH, free trade is hardly the greatest threat to Canadian sover-
eignty. The separatist movement in Quebec is a much greater threat.
Compared to the pressures of conformity imposed by international
environmental concerns and the increasing international focus on
human rights, labor and other social policy issues, trade-related en-
croachments on sovereignty may be minor.
FIFTH, because the FTA and NAFTA are agreements between fed-
eral governments to which provincial and state legislatures are not
parties, provincial and state sovereignty may be less affected by free
trade imperatives.
FINALLY, there is another way to look at the influence of free trade
on Canadian sovereignty; that is, to recognize it as a potential impe-
tus for progressive change in social, economic, labor and environmen-
tal policies. Sovereignty in a small global marketplace is simply dif-
[Vol. 20:319 1994
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ferent from the sovereignty envisioned by the authors of Canada's
British North America Act because the economic community in
which Canada operates today has changed.
CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERALISM
I do not pretend to be an authority on the subject of "sovereignty."
But I like the definition put forward by Johan D. van der Vyver in his
1991 article entitled "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional
and International Law."' He holds that there are three basic elements
of sovereignty within the meaning of international law:
a) external independence;
b) internal autonomy; and
c) territorial integrity.
He goes on to say, quoting from other sources:
The external dimension of sovereignty denotes "the right of the state
freely to determine its relations with other states or other entities
without the restraint or control of another state." The internal dimen-
sion of sovereignty is "the state's exclusive right or competence to de-
termine the character of its own institutions, to ensure and provide for
their operation, to enact laws of its own choice and ensure their re-
spect." Finally, the territorial dimension of sovereignty finds expres-
sion in "the complete and exclusive authority which a state exercises
over all persons and things found on, under or above its territory."'2
In a federalist state such as Canada, where legislative powers have
been meted out between federal and provincial governments, these at-
tributes can be applied at both federal and provincial levels. How so?
In his text, Constitutional Law of Canada,' Peter Hogg observes:
In a federal state, governmental power is distributed between a cen-
tral (or national or federal) authority and several regional (or provin-
cial or state) authorities, in such a way that every individual in the
state is subject to the laws of two authorities, the central authority
and a regional authority. . . . The central authority and the regional
authorities are "coordinate," this is to say, neither is subordinate to
the other. The powers of the Legislature of Ontario are not granted
by the Parliament of Canada, and they cannot be taken away, altered
or controlled by the Parliament of Canada. And the Legislature of
Ontario, even acting in concert with all the other provincial Legisla-
tures, is likewise incompetent to take away, alter or control the powers
of the Parliament of Canada.4
2 Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and Interna-
tional Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 321 (1991).
2 Id. at 419-420.
3 PETER W. HOGG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (2d ed. 1985).
4 Id. at 80.
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One of the ideals of federalism, then, is that the regional authori-
ties comprised by the federation are "coordinate" powers - not
subordinate, either to each other or to the central authority. In some
federalist states, the central authority is actually subordinate to the re-
gional authorities. In Canada this is not the case. Under the Constitu-
tion Act,5 the Canadian provinces have been granted legislative juris-
diction in the following areas:
- property and civil rights in the province;
- direct taxation;
- intra-provincial trade and commerce;
- environmental law in the province;
- labor law relating to provincially regulated industry;
- criminal procedure.
Some of the basic powers of the federal parliament are as follows:
- inter-provincial trade and commerce;
- taxation (direct and indirect);
- environmental law;
- labor law relating to federally regulated industry;
- criminal law.
The overlap in the federal and provincial jurisdictions is obvious.
As well, there are ways in which the legislative authority of both the
provinces and parliament may be curtailed.
Although the provinces do not have complete autonomy, they do
have a sufficient degree of independent legislative jurisdiction to be re-
garded as "sovereign" entities in relation to a number of key areas in-
cluding social, economic, criminal, public health, labor and environ-
mental policy-making. Generally, within these legislative spheres and
within their provincial boundaries, the manner in which they function
under the Constitution Act' has all three attributes of sovereignty de-
scribed by Mr. van der Vyver: external independence; internal auton-
omy; and territorial integrity. The social policies of the Canadian prov-
inces, as reflected in provincial legislation, are by no means uniform.
THE FTA AND NAFTA - EFFECT ON SOVEREIGNTY
The three main attributes of sovereignty are more ideals than ac-
tual characteristics of real sovereign states, because in the late twenti-
eth century individual states must co-exist in an increasingly interwo-
ven web of relationships. An extensive network of international laws,
treaties, regulations and diplomatic alliances has developed among na-
tions, dealing with everything from the use of international waters to
tax matters, human rights and the extradition of criminals. Sovereign
states are not always free to do as they wish, even within their own
Canada Act, R.S.C., c. 11-44 (1982); including The Constitution Act (1982).
'Id.
[Vol. 20:319 1994
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territorial boundaries. Even so, free trade is seen by some as one of the
greatest threats to sovereignty. In Canada, where we have not suc-
ceeded in removing barriers to trade even between provinces, perhaps
this is to be expected.
Fundamental to free trade is the desire to dismantle barriers to the
flow of trade across international borders. Many obvious barriers have
been eliminated - tariffs and subsidies - and the focus has shifted to
those that are less obvious. It is the free trade imperative of eradicating
these "low-visibility" trade barriers that seems to threaten sovereignty.
In his article, The Limits of Free Trade: Sovereignty, Environmental
Protection, and NAFTA,7 Michael Dunleavy states:
As economic theory and the reality of a shrinking world have driven
nations toward economic integration through bilateral and multilat-
eral trade arrangements, the issues raised by the lowering of trade
barriers have begun to change, trade issues have become far more
difficult to extract from the social and political context in which they
arise, and resolutions are far more difficult to arrive at than was the
case with the threshold issues of trade negotiations, such as tariffs or
overt subsidization. Quite simply, the new issues being raised strike
closer to the heart of what constitutes state sovereignty and political
independence, making them both theoretically complex to address and
politically volatile.8
Mr. Dunleavy's view is that when we are dealing with potential trade
barriers which, nonetheless, may be justifiable as instruments of legiti-
mate social and other policies unrelated to trade, we are dealing with
issues that threaten sovereignty:
Simply by virtue of making determinations on these questions, negoti-
ators and tribunals threaten to usurp the traditional decision-making
role of the sovereign state. When domestic policy considerations on
issues indirectly related to trade are transformed into trade issues,
subject to the rules and agreements in the international trade area,
this more or less directly pits trade liberalization against state sover-
eignty. . . . This raises extremely serious questions about the freedom
of an electorate to choose their policies in the context of a trade
agreement. One might argue that such trade agreements are ap-
proaching a quasi-constitutional status when they operate to override
democratic interests. 9
Michael Dunleavy, The Limits of Free Trade: Sovereignty, Environmental Protection, and
NAFTA, 51 U. TORoNTO FAC. L. REV. 204 (Spring 1993).
" Id. at 206.
" Id. at 206.
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FREE TRADE AND CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND
LABOR POLICY-MAKING
Whatever the threat to Canadian sovereignty posed by North
American free trade may be, I believe that the risk is justified by the
economic benefits of a strong North American trading zone. I propose
to examine the so-called threat in the context of Canadian sovereignty
as expressed through its environmental and labor policies. I have cho-
sen these areas because environmental and labor laws have a direct
impact on railways, such as CP Rail System, operating in Canada and
the United States. As well, in Canada the provincial legislatures and
the federal parliament both have jurisdiction in these areas. To the ex-
tent that free trade influences environmental or labor policies, the sov-
ereignty of both the provinces and the nation are affected.
1. Labor
Under the Constitution Act,' 0 the Canadian parliament has juris-
diction over unemployment insurance and labor in certain industries
operating in the national economic sphere. These include banking, tele-
communications, the airlines and interprovincial railways. The prov-
inces have jurisdiction over labor in all other industries - and these in-
dustries employ approximately 90% of the Canadian labor force. With
respect to this 90%, collective bargaining and labor standards legisla-
tion also come under exclusive provincial authority.
With the introduction of the Canada/U.S. FTA, it was feared that
the elimination of trade barriers would drive individual provinces and
states to reduce labor protections, and so lower the cost of labor, in
order to attract businesses and keep them operating in their respective
jurisdictions. In his article, Canadian Labour Law Reform and Free
Trade," Brian Langille refers to this as the "race to the bottom" syn-
drome. Theoretically, the problem might be exacerbated in the field of
Canadian labor policy because of the parallel jurisdiction of individual
provinces in labor law. G. Betcherman and M. Gunderson, in their ar-
ticle, Canada-U.S. Free Trade and Labour Relations,12 suggest:
In all likelihood the greatest effect of the FTA on industrial relations
will be indirect, through pressure to harmonize labour laws. This will
occur as governments (both federal and provincial) will be forced to
reassess laws regarding collective bargaining, employment standards,
and human rights, given that their cost consequences could make it
more difficult for competitive firms to compete against American
10 Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. 11-44 (1982); including the Constitution Act (1982).
" Brian Langille, Canadian Labour Law Reform and Free Trade, 23 OTTAWA L. REV.
(1991).
12 Gordon Betcherman & Morley Gunderson, Canada-U.S. Free Trade and Labor Relations,
41 LAB. L.J. (1990).
[Vol. 20:319 1994
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firms, which tend not to face such strong regulatory constraints. Re-
trenchment could conceivably involve restrictions on new initiatives
and reduced enforcement or updating or even repeal of existing
initiatives. 13
But, the dreaded "race to the bottom" has not occurred. Ironi-
cally, the reason may be that put forward by P. Weiler in Governing
the Workplace.14 Mr. Weiler argues that the result of the competitive
pressures arising out of the parallel jurisdiction of all Canadian prov-
inces in labor legislation is actually labor policies that are more
progressive.
One reason why Canada's laws have been so much more innovative
and progressive is that in Canada the basic constitutional responsibil-
ity for the law at work resides at the provincial rather than the federal
level. . . . (T)he fact that each province has this responsibility for the
major industries within its borders means that the provinces also have
both the opportunity and the incentive to act, in Brandeis's phrase, as
"laboratories for social experimentation." Almost all the significant
advances in the Canadian law of the workplace first took hold in indi-
vidual provinces (as did many of the pioneering efforts in health care,
civil rights, and other policy fields) and then spread gradually through
a natural process of emulation and competition to other jurisdictions
across the country, including the federal government. .... 1.
In fact, both Ontario and British Columbia have recently enacted legis-
lation which, far from diminishing worker protections, strengthens
them considerably. The 1992 B.C. Labour Relations Code:
- prohibits the hiring of replacement workers during strikes and
lockouts;
- grants broader rights to dependent contractors to unionize;
- enhances mediation and arbitration services to expedite dispute
resolution;
- makes union certification easier to obtain; and
- restricts the manner in which employers may organize their affairs
in order to avoid union successor rights.
In Ontario, the Employment Standards Act and Labour Relations Act
were amended in 1993. The amendments extended successor rights pro-
tection of unionized workers and made union certification easier.
The fact that, prior to the FTA, competition among Canadian
provinces with parallel legislative jurisdiction in labor precipitated
neither a "race to the bottom" nor an abandonment of provincial sover-
eignty suggests that similar competition between Canada, the U.S. and
13 Id. at 459.
'4 PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOY-
MENT LAW (1990).
15 Id. at 302.
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Mexico as a result of the FTA and NAFTA is unlikely to do so. There
has been no evidence of a reduction in labor protection in Canada thus
far; furthermore, it is an obvious but important point that both the
FTA and NAFTA are agreements between federal governments. Cana-
dian provincial governments, therefore, are free to enact and enforce
their own labor laws and regulations, and these will not be subject to
direct attack under the FTA or NAFTA as barriers to trade.
Nonetheless, changes in labor law resulting from pressures
brought about through the FTA and NAFTA need not necessarily be
bad, nor must they necessarily be viewed as a threat to sovereignty. On
this point, Mr. Langille asks: "What is wrong with Nova Scotian voters
preferring a government which makes a decision to trade-off labor
rights for jobs and investments? Is that not simply a rational choice
and one which we should not second-guess?"' 6
2. Environment
In Canada, both the provincial legislatures and the federal parlia-
ment have legislative jurisdiction over the environment. The "race to
the bottom" syndrome has also been seen as a potential threat to sover-
eignty in environmental regulation. Some think that individual prov-
inces and states will scramble to lower environmental standards so as to
reduce production costs and attract and keep businesses. Sovereigntists
and environmentalists also fear that legitimate environmental regula-
tions may constitute barriers to trade and, therefore, be disallowed.
This kind of issue arose in a dispute between the U.S. and Canada
over a Canadian regulation requiring that all salmon and herring
caught within Canada's 200-mile limit off the west coast be landed and
processed in British Columbia (B.C.). The matter was initially taken
up under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Ca-
nada argued unsuccessfully that the regulation was justified as a form
of quality control and a means of ensuring conservation of fish stocks.
The GATT panel thought otherwise. In response, Canada brought in
new regulations more directly tied to conservation. The requirement for
processing in B.C. was dropped, but the landing requirement was main-
tained, ostensibly so that B.C. could monitor potential over-fishing. The
U.S. filed another complaint, this time under the then recently exe-
cuted FTA. The FTA dispute resolution panel found that the regula-
tion constituted an unfair impediment to trade. The environmental con-
cern of over-fishing might have been a partial justification for the
regulation, but the 100% landing requirement went beyond legitimate
environmental concerns and was obviously adopted for economic
reasons.
The test the panel used to make this determination may be dis-
16 Langille, supra note 11, at 620.
[Vol. 20:319 1994
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turbing to sovereigntists. It implies, according to Michael Dunleavy:
If no environmental regulation can be passed in the future that may
have an incidentally beneficial effect in the trade realm, this will place
a heavy onus on the enacting party to justify environmental regula-
tions. High standards that are completely justified by environmental
concerns and possibly desired by the electorate are at risk if they have
tangential trade benefits under such a test.17
I do not share this concern, particularly in the context of the FTA.
First, sovereignty in environmental policy is already compromised re-
gardless of free trade agreements. As Mr. Dunleavy himself recognizes:
Environmental protection was not limited to the domestic context.
Many environmental problems are simply too diffuse or enormous for
individual states to handle, and this has resulted in a burgeoning area
of international cooperation on the environment. On a diverse slate of
environmental issues, states have come to recognize the danger or the
futility of acting alone and have agreed to regulate the international
scene. The hazardous waste trade was carefully regulated. Ozone-de-
stroying chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were banned. International play-
ers began to talk about issuing "trading permits" for the burning of
fossil fuels to help encourage reductions to curb global warming. 8
In short, environmental issues are often international in scope because
pollution crosses arbitrary international borders. Through international
environmental treaties, laws and agreements, there is already consider-
able pressure to harmonize environmental standards throughout the
world and, in particular, between Canada and the United States.
Second, the environmental standards of Canada and the U.S. are
already relatively compatible. The two countries recognize, quite apart
from their respective trade interests, that some consistency is desirable.
An abandonment of sovereignty in respect of environmental policy
through a "race to the bottom" is therefore unlikely.
With the entry of Mexico under NAFTA, the dynamic may be
altered. While the consequences of NAFTA on North American envi-
ronmental policies are largely unknown at this time, a few things may
be noted:
1. Article 904 of NAFTA provides, in part:
1. Each party may, in accordance with this Agreement, adopt, main-
tain or apply any standards-related measure, including any such mea-
sure relating to safety, the protection of human, animal or plant life
or health, the environment or consumers, and any measure to ensure
its enforcement or implementation. Such measures include those to
prohibit the importation of a good of another Party or the provision of
a service by a service provider of another Party that fails to comply
17 Dunleavy, supra note 7, at 213.
18 Id. at 213-214.
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with the applicable requirements of those measures or to complete the
Party's approval procedures.19
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, each Party
may, in pursuing its legitimate objectives of safety or the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers,
establish the levels of protection that it considers appropriate ....
2. Article 1114 provides, in part:
1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent
with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that invest-
ment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns."
Under the September 14, 1993 side deal on NAFTA, Canada, Mexico
and the United States agreed that fines could be levied for failure to
enforce their own domestic environmental protection laws. Mexico and
the U.S. also agreed to the imposition of trade sanctions for such fail-
ure. These provisions, and others in NAFTA relating to the environ-
ment, are loosely worded, but they do indicate an attempt to respect
the sovereignty of the signatories in environmental policy-making. How
they will be applied in the future is difficult to predict.
MITIGATION OF FREE TRADE THREATS TO SOVEREIGNTY
In my view, the two main ways in which the threats to Canadian
sovereignty posed by free trade may be reduced are harmonization of
policies and dispute resolution mechanisms.
1. Harmonization of Policies
To the extent that the policies of Canada, the United States, Mex-
ico and their respective provinces and states are in greater conformity,
the possibility that those policies will be attacked as a violation of trade
principles under the FTA or NAFTA is reduced. When such attacks
are reduced, so also are the threats to sovereignty.
But, there are many who argue - and I agree with them to some
extent - that harmonization itself threatens sovereignty. However, those
who see free trade as the primary motivation for harmonization fail to
recognize that there are other pressures being exerted in that direction.
I have referred earlier to the need for international conformity on envi-
ronmental laws, a need arising primarily out of a realization that envi-
ronmental problems are often international in scope. There is also sig-
nificant pressure for greater international harmony in human rights
11 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 904.
20 Id.
21 Id. at art. 1114.
[Vol. 20:319 1994
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legislation arising out of an ever increasing focus by the international
community on social and human rights matters.
In terms of environmental policy, Canada's freedom to set its own
course is already somewhat curtailed by virtue of its participation in a
number of international agreements. For example, Canada is a signa-
tory to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (1987), the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pol-
lution (1979), and the 1985 and 1988 Protocols under that convention
dealing with reduction of sulphur dioxide levels and with nitrogen oxide
pollution. Canada and the U.S. have also been negotiating on the con-
trol of acid rain and are taking action on pollution and water level is-
sues concerning the Great Lakes. In light of these non-trade pressures
toward policy harmonization, I see free trade in North America as a
lesser threat to Canadian sovereignty, at least with regard to environ-
mental and labor policy.
2. Dispute Resolution
To the extent that greater harmonization of policies does not occur
and is not imposed by the FTA or NAFTA, the dispute resolution
mechanisms provided for in these agreements offer an avenue for chal-
lenging specific policies as constituting barriers to trade. Some see
these mechanisms as further threats to sovereignty. Dunleavy notes
that under the FTA, not only governments, but
• . . third parties such as businesses or industries affected by legisla-
tion can apply for a trade ruling under Chapter 19 of the Agree-
ment. . . . This raises the possibility of interested industries lobbying
through the dispute process to have restrictive environmental and
other legislation overturned (since Chapter 19 decisions are binding
under the FTA).22
However, the fact that dispute resolution mechanisms are provided
for in the FTA and NAFTA indicates that free trade imperatives do
not necessarily dictate non-trade related policies. Nor are they always
successful in imposing harmonization to the detriment of the exercise
of sovereign powers. As Mr. Dunleavy himself notes:
Although dispute resolution mechanisms are an integral part of any
trade agreement, in which some disputes can always be expected to
arise, they can also represent manifestations of the failure of parties
to agree on fundamental issues. In the context of environmental con-
siderations, for example, the failure of the parties to come to terms on
the issue of how to handle the potential conflict of trade and environ-
mental protection may require them to rely more heavily on the dis-
22 Dunleavy, supra note 8, at 236.
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pute settlement provisions to handle these conflicts when they arise.2"
I do not agree that dispute resolution mechanisms signal a failure
to agree on fundamental issues. I see them as a means of allowing sov-
ereign states to agree to disagree on certain policies in specific areas. In
the absence of such mechanisms, disagreement on these policies might
have scuttled any over-all trade deal because the parties would have
been incapable of comprehensively resolving - much less harmonizing -
their differences.
Thus, while dispute resolution mechanisms provide a means of
challenging sovereign policy-making authority on a specific, case-by-
case basis, they also, and perhaps more significantly, allow sovereign
authority to be recognized and accommodated.
CONCLUSIONS
I return to the conclusions which I outlined earlier:
1. The concept of sovereignty in the Canadian federalist context has
more than one application. As a result of the Constitution Act,
which distributes legislative powers between the provincial legisla-
tures and the federal parliament, it is appropriate to speak not only
of the sovereignty of Canada, but of the separate sovereignty of
each province within its sphere of legislative jurisdiction.
2. While North American free trade may influence the use of sover-
eign powers by both Canada and its provinces, increasing harmoni-
zation of laws and the provision of dispute resolution mechanisms
in the FTA and NAFTA can actually, and perhaps ironically, miti-
gate the detrimental effect on sovereignty. I believe there are other
forces driving the move toward harmonization of legislation than
those presented by free trade. The existence of dispute resolution
mechanisms represents a realization that harmonization of laws
will not likely ever be complete.
3. Canada's entry into the FTA and NAFTA was, in itself, an ex-
pression of sovereignty. That the consequences could involve a re-
straint on the future exercise of sovereignty may be regarded as
incidental - and authorized - ramifications of that expression.
4. Free trade is hardly the greatest threat to Canadian sovereignty. It
is insignificant compared to other, and not necessarily detrimental,
pressures of conformity imposed by issues such as international en-
vironmental concerns and the increasing international focus on
human rights, labor and other social policy issues.
5. Because the FTA and NAFTA are agreements between federal
governments, to which Canadian, American and Mexican provin-
cial and state governments are not .parties, it is possible that the
2S Id. at 235.
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pressures of free trade will be less effective with respect to the ex-
ercise of sovereign powers by such governments.
Instead of looking at free trade as a threat to sovereignty, I see it as a
potential impetus for progressive change. Whether any particular
change represents a race to the bottom or to the top often depends on
one's perspective. With industry's enhanced flexibility to do business
throughout North America, individual jurisdictions will be more aware
of what their counterparts are doing, and there is the likelihood that
some creative cross-fertilization of ideas will be the result.
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